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WHERE IS THE "THERE" IN HEALTH 
LAW? CAN IT BECOME A COHERENT 
FIELD? 
Mark A. Hallt 
Carl E. Schneider; 
GERTRUDE STEIN COMPLAINED OF OAKLAND, "There 
is no there there."' Churchill complained of his pudding that "it has 
no theme."2 And everybody complains of health law that it lacks an 
organizing principle. Health law scholars bemoan the "pathologies" 
of health law3 and its contradictory and competing "paradigms'.4 
which form a "chaotic, dysfunctional patchwork."5 
But it should not surprise us that any field which grows by accre-
tion lacks a unifying idea or animating concern. And health law cer-
tainly grew by accretion. It began in the 1960s, when the Law-
t Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor, Wake Forest University. 
! Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor Internal Medicine, 
University of Michigan. 
1 GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (Cooper Square 
Publishers 1976) (1937). 
2 Conversation between Winston Churchill and a waiter at the Savoy Hotel, 
in LORD HOME, THE WAY THE WIND BLOWS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 217 (1976). 
3 Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 
1452 (1994) (arguing that health law suffers from the pathology of applying its four 
different paradigms inconsistently). 
4 Various discussions on health law's different intellectual paradigms can be 
found in TASK FORCE ON HEALTH LAW CURRICULA, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF LAW AND 
MEDICINE, HEALTH LAW AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION ( 1985) (outlining a compre-
hensive framework and organization of the field); George J. Annas, Health Law at the 
Turn of the Century: From White Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 CONN. L. REV. 551 (1989) 
(proposing an paradigm for health law focused on social justice, bioethics, and public 
health); M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 249 (2003) 
(arguing that health law is both chaotic and unruly); Elhague, supra note 3; Clark C. 
Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm of Medical Care: Obstacle to Decentraliza-
tion, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 415 (1990) (criticizing the professional paradigm); Rand E. 
Rosenblatt, Conceptualizing Health Law for Teaching Purposes: The Social Justice 
Perspective, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 489 (1988) (summarizing different approaches to 
health law); Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The 
Rise of a New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 395,408-14 (1994) (analyzing the 
shifting paradigms in health law and critiquing economic rationality as an organizing 
principle). 
5 Bloche, supra note 4, at 321. 
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Medicine Center was established, concerned with medical proof in 
litigation, physicians' malpractice, and public-health regulation. Dur-
ing the 1970s, bioethics was taken into the fold. And in the 1980s, 
economic and regulatory topics gained prominence in the field. 
Health law, then, is more the creature of history than of systematic 
and conceptual organization. It looks hardly more cohesive than a 
"law of horses." As Judge Easterbrook once quipped about cyberlaw: 
"Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people 
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of 
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at 
horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 'The 
Law of the Horse' is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying prin-
ciples."6 
This is not to say that there have been no attempts to give health 
law the dignity of an explaining principle. Medical law has in recent 
years entertained two competing paradigms - the patients' rights ap-
proach and the law and economics approach. The patients' rights 
approach at heart hopes that medicine can be regulated by endowing 
patients with rights of autonomy to which medical professionals and 
institutions must defer. The law and economics approach at heart 
hopes that medicine can be regulated in the market, by consumers 
making purchasing decisions that discipline medical institutions. 
Both these approaches have their merits. Not least, both have 
helped temper the tendency of medicine to exalt its guild interests and 
have helped put the patient at the center of the law's concerns. Never-
theless, there is today discontent with both paradigms. Few people 
suppose that markets can solve all problems, and many people doubt 
that the medical marketplace can ever work really well. Furthermore, 
the law and economics paradigm offends the political sensibilities of 
many scholars who write in the area. The patients' rights view has 
enamored academics, but today even many academics are beginning 
to feel that that view is bumping against the point of diminishing re-
turns. In addition, while both the patients' rights and the law and eco-
nomics approaches put the patient at the center of their universe, they 
imagine a patient who does not exist. The patients' rights approach 
imagines patients vigorously exercising and protecting their autonomy 
in order to pursue unique "life plans." The law and economics ap-
proach imagines consumers making purchasing decisions based on a 
well-developed understanding of what they want and what the mar-
6 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U. CHI. 
LEGAL F., 1996, at 207. 
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kets offer. Crucially, however, real patients are little like either of 
these stick figures. 
We suspect there is no grand organizing principle for medical law 
because there cannot be. Medical law deals with medical activities in 
too many settings and must borrow from too many areas of law. Nev-
ertheless, we believe medical law can adopt a more useful analytical 
perspective, one that tends to distinguish it from other areas of law. 
We propose an analytical framework that views health care law as a 
law of relational webs rather than a law of transactions. 
A transactional perspective takes the atomistic view that each 
medical encounter is a discrete event rather than part of an on-going 
web of relationships. A relational web perspective, on the other hand, 
views medical encounters more holistically, as part of a larger context 
formed by the parties' interactions with each other and their relation-
ships with other individuals and institutions. For example, informed 
consent law essentially requires separate consent for each component 
of service within an illness (invasive testing, surgery, pharmaceuti-
cals, etc.). A relational perspective, on the other hand, views medical 
encounters more holistically, as part of a larger context formed by the 
parties' interactions. For example, the law recognizes patients' de-
pendence by structuring the duty to treat around episodes of illness 
and preventing physicians from unilaterally dropping a sick patient 
without either the patient's permission or enough notice to give the 
patient time to find another doctor. 
The transactional perspective grows out of the fact that medical 
law generally has not answered its basic questions by developing a set 
of doctrines specific to its subject. Rather, it has treated medicine as a 
business virtually like any other, and it has drawn its doctrines from 
the many fields of law that govern ordinary commercial affairs. But 
business law abstracts. It is disinclined to search out the particular 
aspects of each business that might make it different from other busi-
nesses and relies instead on generalizations about how all business 
works and should work. Law sometimes considers the ways medicine 
is a business that poses special problems, but other times it does not. 
And it rarely asks which approach is preferable. In short, medical law 
plucks from the web of life individual transactions and treats them as 
discrete events. But because medical law thus analyzes events in iso-
lation from their context, it repeatedly misunderstands those events 
and assigns inappropriate legal consequences to them. Medical law 
thus condemns itself to operate at a fatal remove from reality. 
All this becomes clearer when we understand the reality that a 
transactional approach ignores. First, real patients live their lives em-
bedded in a web of relationships and personal histories that shape 
their thought and behavior in ways not easily incorporated by a trans-
104 HEALTH MATRIX [Vol. 14:101 
actional model. Little in the lives of most people makes them the en-
thusiastic and skilled decision-makers that transactional law often 
imagines. 7 And insofar as patients think about themselves in medical 
contexts, they think-we suspect-primarily in non-transactional 
terms. They think that, at its heart, health care is about a relation-
ship-the relationship between doctor and patient-that is in its es-
sence and at its best not a legal relationship. Instead, it is a relation-
ship which in some ways is damaged by being considered in transac-
tional legal terms. In this way it resembles another institution gener-
ally apt for legal regulation: marriage, a relationship in which trust is 
crucial and personal relations are central.8 
Second, real patients not only live in a web of relationships with 
their friends, families, and physicians that affect the way they act as 
rights-holders and as consumers. They also have web-like relation-
ships with various medical institutions. Doctors organize into practice 
groups and refer patients to specialists and clinics. When patients are 
sicker, they enter hospitals and other complex parts of the health care 
enterprise. Furthermore, patients have increasingly elaborate financial 
and treatment relationships with health insurers. And, important deci-
sions about insurance are frequently made through employers. 
Unfortunately, the law tends to view each of these relationships as 
bilateral and one dimensional, rather than as part of a complex web of 
relationships. For instance, courts that adjudicate disputes over insur-
ance coverage often fail to see that decisions about medical necessity 
for insurance purposes might also affect physicians' standard of care 
under liability law.9 Also, because law operates at a level of abstrac-
tion, it ignores a good deal about the circumstances of medical per-
sonnel and institutions by assuming they respond in predictable ways 
to a narrow range of stimuli. 
In sum, considering the psychological reality of treatment encoun-
ters and the complex structure of relationships among patients, physi-
cians, facilities, insurers, employers, and many others, we need a law 
of relationships that accommodates the unique features of the medical 
arena, not a set of generic or abstract legal principles derived largely 
7 See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, 
DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS ( 1998) (examining whether patients actually want 
the responsibility of making medical decisions for themselves and whether they have 
the ability to do so effectively). 
8 Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 477 
(2002). 
9 See William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, 
Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2004). 
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from commercial law or the law of individual rights. That law of rela-
tionships must be based on a view of the world as it actually is, of 
people and institutions as they actually are. Not least, that law must 
recognize the status of patients and the psychological and emotional 
vulnerabilities entailed in seeking medical care. 
So what is to be done? Lawmakers need to be alert to the choice 
between transactional and relational perspectives in medical law. 
Examples of each can be found sporadically in judicial decisions, 
statutory and regulatory authorities, and academic commentary, but 
these choices are usually made without reflection. Therefore, no con-
sistent pattern has emerged, and the choices are often ill advised (in 
both directions). In short, some areas may benefit from being less 
transactional, while others may need to remain primarily transactional, 
or become less relational. An analytical framework is needed to iden-
tify the important issues and provide conceptual tools for deliberation 
and resolution. 
If lawmakers are to make wise choices about when to proceed 
transactionally and when to proceed relationally, they will need to 
understand better than they do how the world actually works. And 
crucially that will be possible only if scholars are willing to do what 
they have been promising to do since the legal realists--empirical 
research. Indeed, even if courts and legislatures persist in an implaca-
bly transactional approach, the malign effects of that approach will be 
considerably ameliorated if the nature of the transactions and the ef-
fects of legal regulation of them are better understood. Only in this 
way will medical-law scholars and lawmakers realize just how often 
the world works in unanticipated ways that keep law from achieving 
its purposes. 
The search for a general theory of medical law is the search for a 
chimera. But scholars of medical law can usefully unite in a shared 
analytical framework-one that brings more rigor to the intuition that 
medicine differs in fundamental ways from other social and business 
arenas. Doing so will generate conceptual and empirical tools for 
deciding whether and when these special qualities should matter for 
the law and when they should not. In sum, we may find medical law's 
"there" not in grander principles but in a wiser method. 
